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The Economic Consequences of
Disappearing Government Debt
FEDERAL BUDGETARY DEVELOPMENTS in the United States of late have
been fast moving and nothing short of outstanding: The latest projections
of the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (CBO) peg the federal surplus for ﬁs-
cal year 2000 in excess of $230 billion, around $50 billion more than its
forecast of just six months earlier. For a generation accustomed to mount-
ing government obligations and dire warnings of adverse macroeconomic
consequences, a surplus in 2000 amounting to 2.4 percent of nominal
GDP—the largest since 1948—would seem to imply a changed economic
landscape.
Yet these developments are not limited to the United States. Several fac-
tors have combined to improve fiscal positions in a number of countries
worldwide. Among these factors are cyclical recoveries that have boosted
income tax revenue, increases in equity values that have produced capital
gains tax windfalls, and spending restraint due in part to spending caps
and, in many European countries, a desire to satisfy the ﬁscal criteria in the
1993 Maastricht treaty. In its latest OECD Economic Outlook, the Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development projects that four-
teen of twenty-three countries covered will achieve fiscal balance or
surplus over the immediate two-year projection period. Indeed, if one
excludes Japan, whose ﬁscal position is moving in the opposite direction,
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9760-06  BPEA Reinhart  12/21/2000 14:18  Page 163the aggregate fiscal balance of the Group of Seven large industrial coun-
tries (the G-7) will have swung from a deficit of more than 3 percent of
their combined GDP in 1996 to a projected surplus of about 
3⁄4 percent by
2001. These developments represent a general shrinkage of governments’
claims on the world pool of saving, rather than a shift in the U.S. govern-
ment’s demands alone. 
Will these worldwide shifts from deficits to surpluses, and the conse-
quent declines in government debt, have important economic conse-
quences? For some the self-evident answer is no. An influential body of
opinion holds that government debt, because it implies a future stream of
taxes to meet interest payments, should not be counted as part of house-
hold wealth. In that view the decline in government debt, by itself, has no
implications for economic activity or ﬁnancial market prices.
1 Instead, any
effects that occur stem only from changes in ﬁscal policies that condition
that path of declining debt. Our interpretation of recent events, however,
is inconsistent with this view. After reviewing the recent ﬁscal experience
of the industrial countries, we focus on three separate ways in which the
disappearance of government debt has economic effects. 
In our interpretation the U.S. budget surplus and its projected continu-
ation and deepening represent a change in policy comparable in magnitude
to the creation of massive deﬁcits in the 1980s. At that time several promi-
nent economists, including Olivier Blanchard, William Branson, Rudiger
Dornbusch, and Martin Feldstein, stressed mechanisms through which a
policy conventionally viewed as providing current fiscal stimulus could
actually have contractionary effects.
2 The core of this insight was that ﬁs-
cal policy in the 1980s was on a path that implied ever-widening deficits,
which would require increasing real interest rates over time.
3 Investors in
capital markets would bring forward to the present their expectations of
higher short-term real interest rates, in the form of higher long-term inter-
est rates, lower stock prices, and a stronger foreign exchange value of the
dollar, before the direct stimulus of additional spending would be felt. 
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1. The classic reference is Barro (1974).
2. The main references include Blanchard (1981, 1984, 1985), Blanchard and Dornbusch
(1984), Branson, Fraga, and Johnson (1985), Dornbusch (1986), and Feldstein (1984).
3. Blanchard and Summers (1984), however, argued that fiscal policy, by itself, was
likely not the cause of the high real interest rates observed around the world at that time, as
there was little evidence of a significant shift in structural saving across the OECD as a
whole. 
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appreciation of the dollar on foreign exchange markets, as the prospect of
a rise in real interest rates in the United States relative to those of its trad-
ing partners gave investors an incentive to increase their dollar holdings
immediately. There is less reason, however, to bring that aspect of the
argument to bear on the present situation. To a first approximation, if
mounting surpluses are a generalized world phenomenon, rather than spe-
cific to the United States, there would seem to be no need for the dollar’s
exchange value to adjust to tilt spending into better balance worldwide.
However, the other two mechanisms—those operating through changes
in long-term rates and in wealth—should be at work. The second section
of this paper discusses how a permanent move toward fiscal stringency,
all else equal, should be associated with expectations of falling real inter-
est rates. The testable implication of this association is that the emergence
of budget surpluses should ﬂatten the term structure of interest rates, both
over time in one country and across countries in any one period. We find
some support for this hypothesis in a panel data set of real-time OECD
projections for budget prospects in nineteen countries over the past twenty
years.
Reductions in government debt of the magnitude implied by many cur-
rent forecasts will require substantial shifts in investor portfolios. These
looming shifts are all the more considerable given the United States’large
current account deficit. Projected by the OECD at around 4
1⁄2 percent of
GDP both this year and next, the ongoing current account deﬁcit belies the
notion of the “twin deficits” of the 1980s. If this international deficit per-
sists, U.S. residents as a group will increase their net indebtedness to for-
eigners even as the federal government pays down its debt. Thus, over the
next few years, foreign investors will have to be induced to hold more U.S.
obligations on net, even as the composition of those obligations shifts
away from government debt toward private debt. 
The third section of the paper attempts to take some measure of the
potential changes in the configuration of expected returns that will make
investors indifferent to such a shift. For this task we rely on the work-
horse of modern ﬁnancial economic analysis, mean-variance optimization.
In that framework, applied in similar contexts by Jeffrey Frankel and by
Benjamin Friedman, the representative global investor is assumed to
choose portfolio shares consistent with maximizing a welfare function that
is quadratic in the expected returns on assets and the covariance of those
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4 One advantage of the model is that it is parsimonious, in that the
effect on expected returns of an assumed change in portfolio shares
depends only on the covariance structure of returns and the specified risk
tolerance of investors. We use data from a variety of sources on the returns
on a set of global assets over the past decade to estimate the means and
covariance of returns. We then consider several scenarios that vary accord-
ing to which asset class crowds into investors’portfolios as government
debt disappears, and according to the assumed risk tolerance of investors.
The bottom line, familiar from Frankel’s work, is that the effect on
expected returns is quite small unless investors are assumed to be ex-
traordinarily skittish toward taking on risk. This effect is particularly to
be expected if U.S. agency and corporate debt securities are available to
replace Treasury securities: investors should readily substitute these secu-
rities for their declining holdings of Treasury securities, given the high cor-
relation between their returns.
This theoretical presumption that large changes in holdings of debt
stocks can be accomplished through small changes in relative returns runs
counter to the apparent preoccupation in financial markets of late over the
shrinking supply of Treasury debt. We therefore consider the possibility
that the model’s characterization of the representative global investor
does not fit all market participants. Some current holders of Treasury
securities may especially prize the safety or the liquidity that these secu-
rities offer. These investors may be less responsive to changes in relative
returns, allowing some scope for more sizable market consequences. 
If it is the safety of Treasuries that these investors value, the scope for
market innovation to fill that gap may be limited. If instead it is liquidity
that now makes Treasuries unique, the situation may change precipitously.
As we describe in the paper’s fourth section, Treasury market liquidity
has deteriorated recently as market participants have become increasingly
concerned about large paydowns in Treasury debt. We offer a model that
captures the self-reinforcing aspect of trading. Traders and some investors
prefer to participate in that market segment in which they believe others
will also participate. As a result, the determination of the depth of a mar-
ket and the scale of trading can be highly nonlinear, and the market may
166 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
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outstanding and their default-free status made it natural that, over the past
couple of decades, participants would gravitate toward an outcome in
which Treasury debt becomes the preferred trading vehicle and market
benchmark. As Treasury debt disappears and this equilibrium breaks
down, liquidity could erode in an abrupt and uneven manner. In that cir-
cumstance, investors preoccupied with holding the most liquid asset may
shift their holdings into alternative assets, leading to the replacement of
Treasuries as the benchmark asset. The stakes attached to becoming that
new benchmark and capturing the associated liquidity premium could be
high as new market conventions coalesce.
The overall conclusion based on the models and results presented here
is that the fiscal discipline that has recently emerged around the world
could have significant macroeconomic benefits, but also some repercus-
sions for global ﬁnancial markets. The U.S. government’s reduced claims
on the limited pool of world saving have no doubt encouraged private
uses of that saving, to the betterment of the capital stock and of output over
time. But those same events will also require a considerable adjustment
in ﬁnancial markets—one that might involve rapid and unpredictable shifts
in trading activity. 
Some Pleasant Fiscal Arithmetic
For over a generation in the late twentieth century, the joint outcome
in the United States of the political process and the state of the economy
was a succession of federal budget deﬁcits. From 1970 to 1997 the general
government deficit averaged 2.7 percent of nominal GDP, and it reached
4.9 percent in 1983 (ﬁgure 1). Financing those cumulated deﬁcits required
issuing $3.5 trillion in U.S. Treasury securities, on net, pushing the total
federal debt held by the public to 49 percent of GDP at its peak in 1993.
In the past few years, inherited discipline from earlier budget reforms,
political stalemate associated with a divided government, and the excep-
tional performance of the economy have combined to break that trend.
Since 1998 the federal budget has been in the black, and about $450 billion
of marketable Treasury debt will have been repaid over the three fiscal
years ending in 2000. And the most recent CBO projections suggest that
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5 Under a CBO scenario in
which spending is held at estimated statutory caps over the next two years
and subsequently grows at the rate of inflation, the budget surplus is pro-
jected to mount to over $
3⁄4 trillion, or more than 5
1⁄4 percent of GDP, by
2009 (figure 1). By the following year, the total stock of Treasury debt in
the hands of the public will have shrunk to $830 billion, one-quarter of
its level ten years earlier and less than 5
1⁄2 percent of GDP.
6
Just as stunning as the magnitude of the improvement has been the
extent to which it took budget analysts unaware. As late as January 1997
the CBO put its estimate of the budget deficit for 2000 at $171 billion, or
more than $400 billion worse than what it now views as the most likely
outcome. And the surprises have continued. As noted at the outset, the
2000 budget surplus projection announced in July of this year was $50 bil-
lion higher than the projection in January, and the situation going forward
168 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
5. CBO (2000b).
6. The Treasury actually begins to accumulate excess cash balances by 2006 under this
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Percent of GDP
CBO July 2000 forecast
CBO January 2000 
forecast
Figure 1. Projected Federal Budget Balance, 1980–2010
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts; CBO (2000a and b).
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1⁄2 trillion in
cumulative surpluses over the coming decade.
All budget projections, however, depend on a host of assumptions about
public policy and the economy stretching well into the future. Alan Auer-
bach and William Gale, for instance, contend that more plausible policy
assumptions would produce a cumulative surplus over the next decade that
is one-tenth that projected by the CBO.
7 Indeed, it is easy to imagine polit-
ical and economic outcomes that would make even the Auerbach-Gale pro-
jections fail to materialize. Nonetheless, the paydown of Treasury debt has
considerable momentum in the near term. Moreover, not all the risks fall
on one side of the distribution. If productivity increases continue to run at
their recent rapid clip, growth of potential output would exceed that
assumed by the CBO by a considerable margin, implying even more tax
inﬂows and reductions in spending than in the agency’s baseline scenario.
Indeed, the impact of changes in the assumed growth rate of the economy
is large. For example, familiar rules of thumb used by budget forecasters
would suggest, given the CBO’s assumptions about spending, taxes, and
debt, that a sustained 0.1-percentage-point increase in economic growth
would add over $200 billion to the cumulative surpluses projected over this
decade.
8
The good budget performance of late derives arithmetically from strong
growth in receipts combined with modest growth in outlays, which appar-
ently owes chieﬂy to three overlapping inﬂuences.
9The single most impor-
tant influence on both of these developments has been a strong economy,
which has produced growth in activity of around 4 percent a year over the
past few years while inflation has remained relatively subdued. In this
period of growth, the automatic stabilizers in the budget have worked
much as economic textbooks prescribe: the robust economy and low
unemployment have boosted tax revenue and helped hold spending on
some entitlements in check. Second, the strong economy has also pro-
duced large cumulative increases in equity and real estate prices, which
have increased receipts from capital gains taxes, and especially large
income gains for high-income households. Taken together, and given the
Vincent Reinhart and Brian Sack 169
7. Auerbach and Gale (2000).
8. CBO (2000a).
9. These developments are surveyed in box 1-1 of CBO (2000b).
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tive tax rate. Third, national authorities must be given some credit for the
budgetary outcome, whether because an emergent political consensus has
become hostile to deﬁcits, or because the end of the cold war made it eas-
ier to trim defense spending, or because a divided government has been
unable to agree on steps that would erode the ﬁscal position.
That fiscal surpluses may have been more a matter of commission (a
political preference for smaller budgets) than of omission (the failure of a
divided government to agree on how to raise spending or cut taxes)
receives some credence from the fact that other industrial countries with
different political arrangements and economic performances are also run-
ning surpluses. As table 1 shows, the United Kingdom and Canada also
have fiscal surpluses that are large relative to the size of their economies.
And the EU countries shown in the table will have shrunk their aggregate
deficit, which averaged nearly 5 percent of their combined GDP in 1995,
to near 1 percent this year and next.
Figure 2 provides some sense of the worldwide character of this move
toward fiscal restraint. Virtually all of the OECD countries have posted
budgetary improvement since the 1996–98 period, as reflected in the ten-
dency for points to cluster above the 45-degree line, which denotes out-
comes that leave the budget unchanged. In most cases these improvements
have come about through increases in receipts combined with relatively
modest changes in spending. (The lonely point in the lower right portion of
the ﬁgure denotes the change in Japan’s ﬁscal position, which, unlike that
of the rest of the industrial world, has deteriorated as a result of a large rel-
ative increase in outlays.)
This rise in the effective tax rate in the OECD countries as a group is
likely to be attributable to developments similar to those in the United
States: capital gains windfalls associated with generally buoyant equity
and property markets, and disproportionate income gains in upper-income
brackets. But some of the improvement also must trace back to ﬁscal dis-
cipline. This reflects changes in the political climate in countries such as
Canada and Sweden, as well as strictures associated with the adoption of
a single currency by the eleven countries in the European Monetary Union
(and other countries hoping to enter at a later date). It is this generalized
move toward restraint that shapes our first description of the worldwide
consequences of ﬁscal surpluses. 
170 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9760-06  BPEA Reinhart  12/21/2000 14:18  Page 171The Effects of Fiscal Restraint on a Global Scale
The policy literature most relevant to current circumstances is the work
in the early 1980s on a seeming oxymoron: contractionary fiscal stimu-
lus. The main insight of this literature was that fiscal policy should be
thought of as a process that affects the entire future path of short-term
interest rates, which, in turn, is embedded in the current prices of long-
lived assets. A ﬁscal policy that exerts a stimulus through its direct effects
on aggregate demand may have the offsetting effect of increasing long-
term interest rates (and decreasing the prices of long-lived assets), because
market participants anticipate that government borrowing will strain the
available pool of savings over time. In effect, ﬁnancial markets bring for-
ward in time the interest rate restraint associated with fiscal stimulus
before that stimulus is felt. This theory owes mostly to Olivier Blanchard,
who first identified the mechanism through which capital markets can
172 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000













Change in receipts (percent of GDP)
Toward budget surplus
Toward budget deficit
Change in outlays (percent of GDP)
Figure 2. Changes in Government Receipts and Outlays in Selected OECD Countries,
1996–98 to 1999–2001a
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook, June 2000.
a. Change in the annual average for the ﬁrst period to that for the second. Data for 2000 and 2001 are projections.
9760-06  BPEA Reinhart  12/21/2000 14:18  Page 172accomplish this “expectational crowding out,” provided more compelling
theoretical underpinnings for household behavior, and considered more
complicated descriptions of policy.
10 Other contributors emphasized the
role of foreign exchange markets in the process,
11 and still others stressed
sectoral dislocations.
12
If fiscal policy launches along a path of continued restraint, investors
will come to expect declining stocks of government debt over time. The
impact of such expectations will depend on whether government debt is
considered part of net worth. If households discount future taxes at a rate
that exceeds the government interest rate, the declining stock of govern-
ment debt represents a predictable reduction in household net worth over
time.
13 Because net worth is an important determinant of consumption
spending, investors who foresee a declining path of government debt
should also anticipate lessening pressures on aggregate demand. In those
circumstances an activist central bank would lower short-term real interest
rates over time to crowd in enough interest-sensitive spending to keep
resource utilization from slipping. Thus the expectation of a declining path
of government debt will also be associated with the expectation of falling
short-term real interest rates.
But economic theory is by no means settled on this issue. If house-
holds discount future taxes at the same rate as interest income from gov-
ernment bonds,
14 government bonds should not be considered part of net
worth, and the economy would exhibit Ricardian equivalence. Were that
the case, our search for imprints of declining government debt on the
macroeconomy would end here. There would be none, as the shrinkage
of future tax liabilities would offset, in a present-value sense, the effects of
a lower debt stock. But the evident reaction in financial markets to
announcements of future government debt reductions, discussed below,
Vincent Reinhart and Brian Sack 173
10. These contributions are to be found in Blanchard (1981, 1985, and 1984,
respectively).
11. Blanchard and Dornbusch (1984); Dornbusch (1986); Branson, Fraga, and Johnson
(1985).
12. Feldstein (1984).
13. In Blanchard’s (1985) model, for instance, future taxes are discounted at the rate of
time preference plus the probability of dying in a given period, implying that government
debt is part of net worth.
14. How this might happen was first identified by Mundell (1960) and later expanded
on by Barro (1974). 
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equivalence actually hold (and the lack of convincing empirical support),
leads us to consider the case in which government bonds are included in
net worth. 
As long as government debt is considered part of net worth, a path
of declining government debt arising from a shift to fiscal surpluses
offers the prospect of falling short-term real interest rates. This is the
crux of expectational crowding out as discussed in the 1980s—or, in this
case, expectational crowding in. The current price of a long-lived asset
will incorporate the expectation of a fall in short-term real interest rates
as soon as that expectation emerges, which may be well before the actual
fiscal restraint is put in place. For instance, under the explanation of
the term structure of interest rates based on expectations hypotheses, a
long-term real interest rate should be a weighted average of current and
expected future short-term real interest rates. As a result, as soon as bud-
getary restraint comes to be expected, the long-term rate should drop.
Moreover, as long as the stock of government debt is declining, the long-
term rate should be below the short-term rate, reflecting the expectations
of lower future short-term rates embodied in the longer-maturity
instrument.
Of course, long-maturity instruments might also include a risk premium
in their return that provides an inducement to investors to lengthen the
duration of their holdings. The important point relates to changes in
returns: a new official commitment to lower debt levels should produce a
more pronounced decline in longer-term rates at first, followed by a
decline in short-term rates over time. That is, the term structure of real
interest rates should flatten or even tilt downward. This statement holds
both over time as the debt stock varies, and across countries as policies
toward debt differ.
But expectational crowding in should work with other long-term assets
as well. Equity prices and the present value of human capital should rise
once investors and households come to anticipate that future earnings and
income will be discounted at lower rates. If ﬁscal restraint were to occur in
the United States alone, investors would also anticipate a growing disad-
vantage to holding dollar assets relative to holding foreign assets, as the
U.S. short-term real interest rate would fall while the foreign rate remained
unchanged. In such a circumstance, the dollar’s value on foreign exchange
174 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
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markets would likely fall. In essence, the prospect of weaker U.S. domes-
tic aggregate demand would be matched by a decline in the dollar’s value
that would tip some additional foreign demand toward the United States.
No such tipping of demand is required, however, if the move toward fis-
cal restraint is global in scope, as the previous section indicated. If other
countries are also trimming their debt stocks, real short-term interest rates
will be falling worldwide, and no rate-of-return disadvantage will arise. As
global aggregate demand falls more or less evenly, declines in real short-
term interest rates will crowd in spending everywhere, without the need for
adjustments to exchange rates to shift demand from one country to
another.
To test these predictions against actual data, we compiled annual obser-
vations on nineteen industrial countries since 1981 from successive issues
of the OECD Economic Outlook. For each year we obtained the OECD
staff’s midyear forecast of the general government fiscal balance for the
current and the following year relative to contemporaneous nominal GDP,
as well as data on various asset prices in each country at the time of the
forecast, including the three-month interest rate, the ten-year interest rate,
and the trade-weighted real exchange rate. The database also includes
OECD forecasts of a number of macroeconomic variables, including the
unemployment rate, the rate of GDP growth, the inflation rate, and the
level of government debt.
The crowding-in effects discussed above imply that expectations of a
budget surplus should prompt the expectation that real short-term interest
rates will decline over time. But because investor expectations are not
directly observed, we must make an inference about them based on asset
prices observed at the time or on the realized path of real short-term inter-
est rates. For instance, the movements in the slope of the U.S. term structure
and the budget balance shown in figure 3 support the view that long-term
interest rates come to embody anticipations of short-term rate movements
associated with changes in the ﬁscal outlook. The U.S. ﬁscal balance dete-
riorated considerably in the early 1980s and again in the early 1990s, and
the yield curve steepened noticeably during both periods. Of course, each
of these episodes came immediately after a recession that could have wors-
ened the ﬁscal balance and increased the slope of the yield curve as mone-
tary policy eased. However, the experience of recent years suggests that
the ﬁscal balance may have an independent effect. Indeed, since the early
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1990s the Treasury yield curve has flattened considerably as the budget
has moved from sizable deﬁcits to surpluses.
The same pattern emerges for other countries to varying degrees, as ﬁg-
ure 4 shows. The United Kingdom witnessed a sharp inversion of its yield
curve in the late 1980s, when its fiscal balance moved into surplus. The
yield curve then steepened as the budget deteriorated in the early 1990s,
but it has once again inverted with the improvement of the budget over
recent years. Japan and Canada also show a negative correlation between
the slope of the yield curve and the ﬁscal balance. In contrast, such a rela-
tionship is not evident in France, Germany, and Italy. France and Germany,
for example, saw their yield curves suddenly invert in the early 1990s even
as their fiscal positions were generally worsening. However, given the
strong links to the foreign exchange market, that inversion most likely
reflects the response to an increase in short-term rates that followed the
breakup of the European Monetary System in 1992.
A more stringent test of the crowding-out hypothesis is to look for this
relationship between fiscal policy and the slope of the yield curve across
a panel of developed economies, allowing for other factors that may affect
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Percent of GDP Percentage points 
Figure 3. U.S. Federal Budget Balance and Spread between Long- and Short-Term
Treasury Yields, 1980–2000a
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts; Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues.
a. Through the second quarter.
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Percent of GDP Percentage points
Figure 4. General Government Budget Balances and Interest Spreads on Government
Debt, 1980–2000a
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, June 2000.
a. Through the second quarter. Budget data for 2000 are projections.
b. Ten-year yield minus the three-month yield.
9760-06  BPEA Reinhart  12/21/2000 14:18  Page 177interest rates.
15 To do so, we regressed the spread between the ten-year
government interest rate and the three-month rate on the budget surplus
as a percentage of GDP projected for the following year.
16 Of course, a
number of factors that might be correlated with the projected surplus, such
as the stage of the business cycle and inﬂation expectations, can also inﬂu-
ence the shape of the yield curve. To control for these effects, we included
in the regression the OECD’s forecasts of the rate of inﬂation, unemploy-
ment, and real GDP growth for the following year.
The results of this regression are presented in the first two columns of
table 2 for two different samples: the full panel of nineteen countries and
the G-7 alone. The regressions allow for fixed effects, and the standard
errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. As the
adjusted R
2 statistics indicate, these variables explain 44 percent or more
of the variation in the slope of the yield curve for both samples. More
important, the outlook for fiscal policy appears to be an important deter-
minant of that slope. An improvement in the budget by 1 percent of GDP
ﬂattens the yield curve by 9 to 12 basis points. The results for the G-7 sam-
ple suggest that the observed swing in the expected U.S. budget balance
from a 3 percent deﬁcit in 1994 to a surplus of nearly 2
1⁄2 percent in 2000
would have been expected to flatten the yield curve by about 67 basis
points.
All the macroeconomic variables in the regression enter significantly
and have reasonable coefficients. Higher expected inflation or higher
expected GDP growth tends to steepen the yield curve, possibly because
these variables are indicators of future monetary tightening. Higher
expected inflation, if accompanied by the perception of greater inflation
risk, might also increase the risk premium on longer-term government
securities. The yield curve tends to steepen during periods of high unem-
ployment as well, probably because monetary policy may be loose during
those periods. The lagged short-term interest rate also appears to capture
178 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
15. The sample includes the G-7 countries (the United States, Japan, Germany, France,
Italy, the United Kingdom, and Canada) and twelve other industrial countries (Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, and Sweden). The data are annual and date back to 1981 for most countries, resulting
in a total of 325 observations.
16. The budget surplus is adjusted for expected inflation so that it more closely repre-
sents the expected change in the real level of government debt.
9760-06  BPEA Reinhart  12/21/2000 14:18  Page 178the impact of the stance of monetary policy, as the yield curve tends to be
ﬂatter when the short-term interest rate is high.
17
Other authors have arrived at mixed results regarding the impact of ﬁscal
developments on interest rates, which is not surprising given the tenuous
relationship between the slope of the yield curve and the budget balance in
other countries (ﬁgure 4). One strand of the literature attempts to measure
the reaction of interest rates to exogenous changes in the fiscal outlook.
Charles Plosser, for example, uses vector autoregressive analysis to mea-
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17. It could be important to control for the level of government spending as well.
Because we lack data on forecasts of government expenditure, we estimated a version of the
equation (results not shown) that includes the actual ratio of expenditure to GDP for the
following year. The magnitude and significance of the coefficient on the budget surplus
increase under that specification, as higher expenditure reduces surpluses and apparently
ﬂattens the yield curve by temporarily pushing up the short-term interest rate.







Independent variable OECD G-7 OECD G-7
Projected government  –0.088** –0.122** –0.064 –0.452**
surplus
d (–2.46) (–2.08) (–0.46) (–3.96)
Projected GDP growth 0.341** 0.349** –0.257 0.153
(3.91) (2.48) (–0.95) (0.79)
Projected inﬂation rate 0.247** 0.282** 0.743** 0.944**
(5.22) (4.08) (4.85) (6.34)
Projected unemployment  0.176** 0.361** 0.304** 0.590**
rate (4.62) (4.36) (3.05) (3.56)
Lagged short-term  –0.249** –0.282** –0.249** –0.431**
interest rate (–8.60) (–5.96) (–2.63) (–4.04)
Summary statistics
Adjusted R
2 0.45 0.44 0.16 0.26
No. of observations 310 133 215 98
Source: Authors’calculations based on annual data over 1981–2000 from OECD Economic Outlook.
a. The OECD sample contains nineteen countries. All specifications control for fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Numbers in parentheses are t statistics. ** denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
b. Difference between ten-year and three-month interest rates, measured in percentage points.
c. Realized change in short-term real interest rates over the subsequent ﬁve years, measured in percentage points.
d. Percent of GDP.
9760-06  BPEA Reinhart  12/21/2000 14:18  Page 179sure monthly surprises in the ﬁscal outlook and ﬁnds no impact on the level
of interest rates.
18 In contrast, Feldstein relies on a survey measure of the
expected budget position and finds that the prospective five-year federal
budget balance has a strong influence on the level of the long-term real
interest rate in the United States.
19 The present paper similarly employs
budget forecasts but instead examines the slope of the term structure and
uses a panel data set. Exploiting the panel dimension of the data, we ﬁnd a
statistically signiﬁcant relationship that would not have held in many coun-
tries had we estimated the equation country by country.
Of course, a number of factors, such as changes in inflation expecta-
tions and risk premiums, could be affecting the slope of the yield curve
besides the expected path of real interest rates. It is difficult to decom-
pose the influences on the yield curve into these various factors. How-
ever, an alternative approach is to investigate the impact of expected fis-
cal balances on the actual path of short-term real interest rates, in effect
replacing expectations as reflected in the yield curve with the realized
change in the short-term real interest rate over the subsequent ﬁve years.
20
Because the actual future path of the interest rate is used as the dependent
variable rather than the expected path, the error term in the equation
includes a forecast error. Under rational expectations, this forecast error
will be uncorrelated with the other regressors, so that the coefﬁcients of the
regression will be unbiased. However, the dependent variable may be very
noisy, as it will be influenced not just by expectations at the time of the
budget forecasts but also by any additional news over the subsequent five
years that affects the real interest rate. Thus it may be more difficult 
to identify the impact of fiscal balances than in the specification using
forward-looking asset prices. 
The last two columns of table 2 show the results from this speciﬁcation.
Although no significant effect is found in the nineteen OECD countries,
perhaps because of other factors that affect future interest rates in the
smaller countries, the projected surplus has a sizable and significant
impact on the change in the real interest rate for the G-7 countries as a
180 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
18. Plosser (1987). Other papers along these lines include Plosser (1982) and Evans
(1985, 1987a, 1987b).
19. Feldstein (1985).
20. The real interest rate is calculated by subtracting the forecasted inﬂation rate for the
current year from the three-month interest rate.
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reflect expectations of real interest rates, at least for the G-7 sample. The
interpretation of the insignificant coefficient for the OECD sample is less
clear.
As a final approach, we investigated whether this specification can
predict movements in the real exchange rate. The results (not shown) indi-
cate that budget surpluses have modest effects that are not significant for
the OECD sample and marginally insignificant (at the 5 percent level)
for the G-7 sample. One reason why these results may be weaker is that
the exchange rate should depend on the relative fiscal positions of various
countries rather than their absolute fiscal positions, as discussed above.
The empirical results indicate that fiscal balances are an important
determinant of the shape of the yield curve across a number of countries,
most likely because of their influence on the expected path of short-term
real interest rates. According to these results, the improvement in fiscal
balances throughout the OECD countries over recent years has likely led
to a significant flattening of global yield curves. Indeed, fourteen of the
eighteen countries in the sample that moved toward surpluses over recent
years have seen a ﬂattening in their yield curves. Aggregating across these
markets, one would conclude that the global yield curve has realized a
sizable repositioning over recent years owing to increased fiscal disci-
pline around the world.
We have looked at only one influence of government budget positions
on the economy, namely, their effect on the slope of the yield curve. That
influence could have many consequences for the real economy over time.
Perhaps most important, the fall in government debt and the attendant
decline in long-term interest rates should encourage private investment,
adding to the economy’s potential to produce output.
21 Although this
effect may depend on a number of conditions,
22 it can be seen in its sim-
plest form through the following equation based on national income
accounting:
(1) saving = investment + net exports.
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21. We implicitly rule out the possibility that the economy is dynamically inefﬁcient, in
which case having a higher debt stock could reduce the overaccumulation of capital and
improve welfare.
22. As described in Friedman (1978).
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represent the accumulation of foreign assets by U.S. residents. Thus, this
relationship can be rewritten as
(2)
public saving + private saving = 
investment + net accumulation of foreign assets,
which indicates that any saving in the economy—public or private—is
invested either in domestic capital or in foreign assets.
23
Under Ricardian equivalence, an exogenous change in public saving is
offset one for one by a change in private saving with no impact on inter-
est rates, so that there are no real effects on investment or on the net accu-
mulation of foreign assets (both sides of the equation are unaffected).
However, if Ricardian equivalence does not hold, an increase in public sav-
ing tends to push down the interest rate, as found in the regressions
described above. In that circumstance, private saving will fall, but by less
than the increase in public saving, because the fall in interest rates stimu-
lates investment that must be ﬁnanced by an increase in total saving. (If ﬁs-
cal developments differ across countries, there will also be an impact on
the exchange rate, so that the net accumulation of foreign assets would also
adjust to bring the above identity into balance.)
Our results on interest rate effects do not directly address the effects
on saving and investment. However, a number of authors have presented
evidence suggesting that private saving does not fully offset changes in
public saving one for one. Table 3 shows the components of the second
equation above for the United States over various periods since 1960 (data
for public saving include that by state and local governments in addition to
the federal government). As Laurence Ball and Gregory Mankiw have
pointed out, the decline in public saving beginning in the 1980s was not
fully offset by an increase in private saving, resulting in a decline in total
saving that may have contributed to the slowdown in investment and the
deterioration of our foreign asset position.
24
182 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
23. Bosworth (1993) reviews this basic national income accounting from a similar
perspective.
24. Ball and Mankiw (1995).
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rience of the U.S. economy as evidence of the benefits of increased fiscal
discipline. As public saving has increased over the past several years, long-
term interest rates have fallen and domestic investment has boomed. How-
ever, these events do not ﬁt neatly into the crowding-in story, because the
investment boom has been only partly ﬁnanced by the increase in total sav-
ing. A fairly striking development over the past few years is that private
saving has fallen off sharply, offsetting about two-thirds of the rise in
public saving. Much of the increase in investment has instead been
financed by foreign investors. The difficulty in interpreting these events
arises because they have not been driven purely by an exogenous shift in
ﬁscal policy, but also by a considerable pickup in U.S. productivity.
25 It is
likely that this productivity growth has encouraged investment and stimu-
lated capital inﬂows as a result of the higher real returns. In addition, to the
extent it has contributed to the historic rise in stock prices, the productiv-
ity surge has pushed down the private saving rate in response to strong cap-
ital gains. To some extent, however, the increase in public saving has also
contributed to the U.S. investment boom, as it has increased total saving
and pushed interest rates below where they would otherwise be. For simi-
lar reasons, the increased fiscal discipline observed throughout the world
should have encouraged investment and growth, given the considerable
Vincent Reinhart and Brian Sack 183
25. Oliner and Sichel (1999) describe this development in detail.
Table 3. Saving and Investment in the United States, 1960–99
Percent of GDP
Change from Change from
Average,  Average,  1960–81 to  Average,  1982–95 to 
Component 1960–81 1982–95 1982–95 1996–99 1996–99
Saving
Public 3.8 0.1 –3.7 3.2 3.1
Private 16.4 17.1 0.7 14.9 –2.2
Total 20.2 17.2 –3.0 18.1 0.9
Investment
Domestic private 16.1 15.7 –0.4 17.0 1.3
Net foreign 0.4 –1.5 –1.9 –2.1 –0.6
Othera 3.7 3.1 –0.7 3.3 0.2
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts.
a. Includes government investment and statistical discrepancy.
9760-06  BPEA Reinhart  12/21/2000 14:18  Page 183impact that, in our estimates, fiscal discipline exerts on the shape of the
global yield curve.
Portfolio Choice
In the previous section, the forces associated with fiscal restraint that
have twisted the term structure of interest rates are due to current and
expected future changes in real short-term rates required to stabilize the
path of output. A change in ﬁscal policy, through its consequences for the
stock of Treasury debt outstanding, could also alter risk premiums on a
wide range of assets, subject to investors’risk tolerance and perception of
risks. This general property has been the hallmark of the portfolio bal-
ance approach to asset pricing.
26
In the current context such portfolio implications of changes in the
stock of government debt may hold particular force. Even as the U.S. fed-
eral budget has moved into surplus, the current account has continued to
deteriorate. The overall current account balance for calendar year 1999
stood at around $350 billion, or 3
1⁄ 2 percent of nominal GDP, slightly
exceeding the record shares of the mid-1980s. Several factors should keep
the current account in sizable deﬁcit. These include strong income growth
in the United States relative to its trading partners, a tendency for U.S.
imports to be more sensitive to U.S. income than U.S. exports are to for-
eign income, and the starting position of a high level of imports compared
with exports.
27 As already noted, the OECD projects that the U.S. current
account deficit will run at about 4
1⁄2 percent of nominal GDP in 2000 and
2001, which is unprecedented in the post–World War II experience.
These current account dynamics have striking implications for ﬁnancial
flows. The U.S. net external investment position has slid to more than
$1 trillion in the red, and net foreign debt will continue to grow as long
as the current account remains in deﬁcit (ﬁgure 5). As the federal govern-
ment has been paying down its debt, foreigners have accounted for a
sharply increasing share of Treasury securities (table 4) and will eventually
184 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
26. This approach is associated with Tobin and Brainard (1963) and Tobin (1969) and
has been explained systematically by Branson and Henderson (1984).
27. A recent description of the forces shaping current account dynamics can be found
in Mann (1999).
9760-06  BPEA Reinhart  12/21/2000 14:18  Page 184be forced, if they are not being forced already, to shift a greater amount
of those holdings into nongovernment debt.
Portfolio theory indicates that the willingness of investors to hold assets
of various types depends on the expected returns of available assets and the
covariance between those returns. As the available supply of Treasuries
Vincent Reinhart and Brian Sack 185
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Net international investment
















Figure 5. Net International Investment Position, 1980–99
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts.
Table 4. Composition of Ownership of Treasury Securities, 1980–2000a
Holder 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000b
Billions of dollars
Held publicly 708.7 1,504.5 2,415.1 3,629.8 3,485.7
Federal Reserve 120.7 169.7 232.5 374.1 505.0
All others 588.0 1,334.8 2,182.6 3,255.7 2,980.7
Percent of all othersc
Individuals 26.2 17.8 20.7 21.7 12.1
Depository institutions 22.8 18.0 11.0 11.0 8.3
Institutional investorsd 12.6 26.2 26.1 27.8 28.1
State and local governments 15.3 18.4 18.4 9.0 8.7
Foreign ofﬁcial institutions 18.2 9.8 12.8 11.1 20.1
Other international investors 2.7 6.3 6.9 14.9 21.6
Other 2.2 3.5 4.1 4.6 1.2
Sources: U.S. Treasury Bulletin, various issues; Federal Reserve, Flow of Funds Accounts.
a. Estimates as of the end of the year except where noted otherwise.
b. Through June.
c. Percent of publicly held Treasury securities excluding Federal Reserve holdings.
d. Includes insurance companies, mutual funds, and pension funds.
9760-06  BPEA Reinhart  12/21/2000 14:18  Page 185shrinks, the relative returns on available assets will have to adjust to induce
investors to shift out of Treasury securities and into other assets. Accord-
ing to the theory, the magnitude of this shift in expected returns depends
crucially on the covariance of the returns on the alternative assets with
the returns on Treasury securities.
These effects can be expressed using a simple portfolio model advanced
by Frankel.
28 Consider an investor who chooses a portfolio so as to maxi-
mize his or her expected utility at the end of the period, where the utility
function is quadratic in the expected returns on assets and the covariance
of those returns. The investor can allocate his or her wealth into n different
assets with excess returns (over the risk-free rate r
f) of rt+1. Given the
vector of portfolio shares xt chosen, the investor’s wealth at the end of the
period, Wt+1, is expected to be
This model can be used to show that the following relationship must hold
between expected returns and portfolio shares:
where   is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and   represents the
variance-covariance matrix of returns. This equation gives the expected
returns that investors would require to hold a given set of portfolio shares.
Alternatively, the equation can be inverted to express the portfolio shares
as a function of the expected returns and covariances, in which case the
equation represents asset demand equations. 
Frankel used this relationship among portfolio shares, expected returns,
and covariances to investigate whether an increase in government debt
crowds out other assets by forcing them to have higher expected returns.
29
Here we explore the reverse question of how a sharp decline in outstand-
ing U.S. Treasury debt would affect expected returns across a number of
different assets.
The ﬁrst step in this exercise is to characterize the portfolio of the global
investor. Table 5 describes the market capitalizations of various categories
( ) ( ) cov( , ) , 4 11 1 Er r r tt t t t ++ +
ƒ =+ ρρ   x
( ) () () .
' 31 11 1 EW W Er Er t t t t tt tt ++ +
ƒ () =+ + [] x
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28. Frankel (1985). Similar applications of this method include Frankel and Engel
(1984) and Friedman (1986), among others.
29. Frankel (1985).
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9760-06  BPEA Reinhart  12/21/2000 14:18  Page 187of assets in global financial markets at the end of 1998. It shows that the
$3.1 trillion in Treasury bonds (where bonds are defined as debt securi-
ties with original maturities of at least one year) outstanding at that time
represented only about a quarter of the $12.6 trillion in outstanding bonds
of all issuers in the United States. Bonds issued by U.S. government agen-
cies and government-sponsored enterprises, including mortgage-backed
securities, accounted for another $3.3 trillion, and U.S. nonfinancial cor-
porate bonds totaled $1.8 trillion. The balance (not shown in the table)
included bonds issued by state and local governments and by financial
corporations.
The U.S. fixed-income market is the world’s largest. Japanese institu-
tions had only $3.9 trillion in bonds outstanding at the end of 1998, and
those of the European countries were $8.3 trillion. A considerable portion
of bonds in both Japan and Europe are government issued. The other major
global issuers are the emerging market economies, which had $2.5 trillion
outstanding as of the end of 1998, mostly denominated in developed-
country currencies such as the dollar. These ﬁgures sum to about $28 tril-
lion in bonds outstanding in the world economy at the end of 1998, a fig-
ure that slightly exceeds the market capitalization of global equity markets
at about $27 trillion. Of that amount, the U.S. equity market accounted
for about $15.4 trillion, or 57 percent, while European stock markets rep-
resented about $7.7 trillion. Looking across all assets, the global investor
appears to hold about equal shares of equities and fixed-income securi-
ties, with half of those assets issued in U.S. markets.
Returns on various classes of financial assets can be measured using
broad market indexes computed by Salomon Smith Barney, J. P. Morgan,
and Morgan Stanley Capital International. These indexes cover four dif-
ferent categories of U.S. bonds as well as U.S. money markets (approxi-
mated by the one-month Treasury bill), U.S. equities, and government
bonds and equities from Japan, Europe, and the emerging markets. Each
index can be used to calculate the total return in dollars on a representative
set of securities, weighted by their market capitalization, in a given asset
class. 
Table 6 provides summary statistics on the returns of those assets from
the ﬁrst quarter of 1991 to the second quarter of 2000. U.S. Treasury secu-
rities, for example, returned 7.4 percent a year, on average, over the sam-
ple, with a standard deviation of quarterly returns of 2.4 percentage points.
Other U.S. bonds performed similarly, with returns that were highly cor-
188 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
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market index, which represented a nearly risk-free asset, had the lowest
average return of all assets. Foreign bond indexes recorded a fairly wide
range of performances. All equity indexes did extremely well over the
sample period, with the exception of the Japanese stock market, which had
a lower return than other equity markets and experienced considerable
volatility. These indexes represent many of the major components of the
global investor’s portfolio, capturing the asset holdings printed in boldface
in table 5. In the exercise that follows, we assume that these indexes rep-
resent the entire universe of assets available to the global investor, a sim-
plification that ignores some other types of financial as well as nonfinan-
cial assets.
Equipped with this snapshot of portfolio shares and the data on returns,
we can use the model described above to assess what might happen to the
relative returns of these asset classes if U.S. Treasury debt were to be paid
off. The impact of a change in portfolio shares on the returns on the various
Vincent Reinhart and Brian Sack 189
Table 6. Returns on Selected Asset Classes, 1991–2000
a
Percent, except where noted otherwise
Average Correlation
annualized Standard Assumed  with  U.S.
quarterly deviation portfolio government 
Asset type return of return share bonds
b
U.S. Treasury bonds 7.35 2.39 6.6 1.00
U.S. agency bonds 7.34 2.37 2.8 0.99
U.S. mortgage-backed  7.23 1.78 4.4 0.89
securities
U.S. corporate bonds 8.00 2.65 4.0 0.93
U.S. money market 4.32 0.22 4.0 0.23
instruments
Japanese government bonds 9.29 7.85 4.9 0.22
European government bonds 5.27 4.86 8.4 0.42
Emerging market bonds 16.55 8.33 5.5 0.29
U.S. equities 18.64 5.23 33.3 0.27
Japanese equities 4.51 11.21 5.4 –0.08
European equities 14.80 5.60 16.7 0.10
Emerging market equities 11.16 12.66 4.1 –0.25
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on quarterly data from Salomon Smith Barney, J.P. Morgan, Morgan Stanley Capital
International.
a. Returns are calculated in U.S. dollars. Data for 2000 are through the second quarter.
b. Expressed as a correlation coefﬁcient.
9760-06  BPEA Reinhart  12/21/2000 14:18  Page 189assets should depend on the coefficient of risk aversion and the covari-
ance between the various asset returns, as follows:
where d represents a differential with respect to time. The vector xt now
represents the portfolio shares of the various asset types listed in table 6,
except the U.S. money market index, which is assumed to be the risk-free
asset. The covariance matrix is calculated under the assumption that the
expected return for each asset is constant over the sample.
30
A couple of important assumptions underlie this equation. One is that
the covariance between returns is itself unaffected by the disappearance
of Treasury debt. There are a number of reasons why this assumption may
not hold. For example, if Treasury debt is replaced by private debt in the
market—a possibility that is explored shortly—the increased leverage by
corporations could affect the probability of default and hence the uncer-
tainty surrounding the returns on those securities. However, assuming
that   is unchanged should provide a useful approximation of the effects
of the debt paydown. In addition, we have measured all returns in dollar
terms. Hence the results apply most directly to dollar-based investors who
invest across all global assets.
31
Table 7 shows the changes in expected excess returns on the various
assets that, according to the model, would result if the share of U.S. Trea-
sury securities in investors’ portfolios were to fall to zero. The impact
depends on how the portfolio shares of other assets react to the disap-
pearance of Treasuries. Over the past few years, as Treasury debt has dis-
appeared, U.S. private debt has crowded in about one for one, keeping
the ratio of total domestic nonfinancial debt to GDP relatively stable. In
contrast, when Treasury debt mounted in the 1980s, total debt relative to
GDP rose well above the relatively constant level that had prevailed since
() ( ) ( ) , 5 1 dE r d tt t + [] =ρ  x
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30. We proxy expected returns by their realizations, which should be reasonable for long
enough samples under the maintained rational expectations hypothesis. However, as Ben-
jamin Friedman pointed out in response to an earlier draft of this paper, survey-based mea-
sures of expected returns would likely be less correlated than ex post returns, implying less
substitutability among assets. Unfortunately, survey-based measures are not available for all
the asset categories we have speciﬁed.
31. We ignore the impact of taxes on the relative returns of assets, which would be dif-
ﬁcult to measure for the global investor.
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32 In light of the various possibilities, we discuss three dif-
ferent scenarios.
Our first scenario explores the possibility that issuance of U.S. corpo-
rate bonds would increase in response to the decline in Treasury securities.
As shown in the upper panel of table 7, under a coefficient of risk aver-
sion of 2, this shift would have very little impact on the returns on all
assets. In fact, the spread between the returns on corporate bonds and Trea-
suries would have to widen a mere 
1⁄2 basis point to encourage investors
to shift about 6
1⁄2 percent of their portfolios—over $3 trillion—currently in
Treasuries into corporate bonds. Although this seems a surprisingly small
effect, the reason for it is fairly clear from the correlations of the returns.
All U.S. ﬁxed-income securities are highly correlated over the sample, so
that shifting between those assets has little impact on the overall risk of
investors’ portfolios. Thus investors are willing to substitute readily
between those assets, with little disruption to the returns on any asset.
These results, however, depend on the assumed coefﬁcient of risk aver-
sion. We can roughly calibrate the level of risk aversion using the snapshot
of investor portfolio shares reported above. Given the average returns of
the assets and their covariance matrix, we can use the model to assess the
level of risk aversion needed to entice investors to hold the observed port-
folio shares of various risky assets on average. A problem with this
approach is that the limited data make the estimated parameter sensitive
to each individual asset. Japanese equities are particularly influential,
because they have a very low average return over the sample and a large
amount of risk. Basing our estimate on U.S. assets alone, we find that a
coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion of 23 is needed to explain actual hold-
ings.
33 Under this higher coefficient of risk aversion, as shown in the bot-
tom panel of table 7, the impact of the paydown in Treasury debt increases
but remains small. Indeed, the corporate yield spread would have to rise by
Vincent Reinhart and Brian Sack 193
32. Friedman has noted, in a number of papers (for example, Friedman, 1982), the sta-
bility of the ratio of total nonﬁnancial debt to GDP through the early 1980s.
33. Although this coefficient seems high, it is still well below that found by Frankel
(1985), who estimated it to be in the neighborhood of 110. There are a number of differences
between the data used by Frankel and those used here. Frankel considers annual returns on
tangible assets, long-term federal debt, state and local debt, corporate bonds, and equities
over the period from 1954 to 1980. Our own analyses using a risk aversion coefﬁcient of 110
resulted in a predicted widening of the spread on corporate yields over Treasuries of only
28 basis points.
9760-06  BPEA Reinhart  12/21/2000 14:18  Page 193only 6 basis points to entice investors to shift completely out of Treasury
securities and into U.S. corporate bonds. 
Larger shifts in relative returns are needed for other assets to crowd in
to replace declining Treasury securities. Foreign government bonds, for
example, are not close substitutes for Treasury securities, in part because of
exchange rate risk. In our second scenario, under the higher risk aversion
coefﬁcient, annual returns on foreign bonds would have to increase about 
1⁄2
to 1 percentage point above returns on U.S. Treasuries for investors to be
willing to shift all of their present Treasury holdings into those securities.
The increase in holdings of foreign bonds also would cause returns on for-
eign equity markets to rise sharply but would have little effect on the U.S.
equity market. The reason is that foreign equity returns tend to be positively
correlated with foreign bond returns, in part because the exchange rate is a
common factor. Investors would prefer to shed some of that common risk
by selling foreign equities and would only maintain their holdings if they
received greater compensation on those securities.
Our ﬁnal scenario assumes that all types of ﬁnancial assets crowd in the
decline in Treasury debt by amounts proportional to their initial portfolio
weights. For this to happen, the expected returns on various equity indexes
would have to rise by amounts ranging from nearly 1 percentage point for
the U.S. market to over 2
1⁄4 percentage points for emerging markets, in
the case where the coefficient of risk aversion is 2. This increase in
expected returns is needed for investors to bear the risk of increasing
their equity holdings, which jump more than $1
3⁄ 4 trillion across these
markets. In this scenario Treasury yields would fall 17 basis points, and
the U.S. corporate yield spread would widen by 12 basis points. Japanese and
European government bond returns would decrease slightly. This is the net
effect of two opposing forces, with the decline in Treasury yields pulling
their returns down, and higher returns on foreign equities pulling them
up. Emerging market bond returns would instead increase noticeably, as
they are more risky and more highly correlated with equity returns.
Although this exercise does not directly address which asset type might
replace Treasuries on investors’ balance sheets, the results suggest that
U.S. corporate, agency, and mortgage-backed debt securities are the most
likely candidates. Because returns on these securities are highly correlated
with returns on Treasuries, it appears that U.S. corporations and agencies
could step up their issuance of debt securities in the wake of Treasury
debt paydowns with little disruption to financial markets. It is no coinci-
194 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
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dence that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have made significant efforts in
recent years to increase their issuance (as discussed in the next section).
34
By contrast, the results suggest that any increase in the issuance of inter-
national debt securities or equities would require a more sizable increase
in the returns on those securities, which may deter issuance. 
In summary, according to the model, the disappearance of Treasury
securities would require only small adjustments to the relative returns of
various financial assets, particularly if U.S. agency and corporate debt
securities crowd in much of the decline in Treasury securities. As noted, to
entice investors to completely shift their Treasury holdings into U.S. cor-
porate bonds, the corporate yield spread would have to widen by a mere
6 basis points under a coefﬁcient of risk aversion of 23. 
The modest impact on relative asset returns suggested by this empiri-
cal exercise seems inconsistent with the widespread concern expressed
by market participants over the shrinking supply of Treasury debt. The
prospect of declining availability of Treasury securities has coincided with
large movements in their yields relative to those of other fixed-income
assets. Spreads between ten-year agency and corporate yields and the yield
on the ten-year Treasury note widened considerably in early 2000. Many
market participants have attributed this widening to a “scarcity premium”
on Treasury securities, which has intensified this year with the release of
CBO budget forecasts indicating that the outstanding Treasury debt held
by private investors could be paid down nearly in full during this decade. 
The continued demand for U.S. Treasury securities despite the sharp
widening of yield spreads may arise from several characteristics that dis-
tinguish Treasuries from other fixed-income securities.
35 First, Treasury
securities are regarded as being free of credit risk, because payments of
principal and interest on those securities are backed by the full faith and
credit of the U.S. government. Second, Treasury securities are extraordi-
narily liquid compared with most other fixed-income securities. The
empirical exercise above does not capture the importance of these charac-
teristics to particular classes of investors.
Indeed, it is not clear to what extent other ﬁxed-income securities could
substitute for the safety and liquidity of Treasury securities. The liquidity
34. These securities also mimic the characteristics of Treasury securities that contribute
to their liquidity.
35. See Dupont and Sack (1999) for a comprehensive description of the Treasury market.
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rival that of Treasuries. However, as discussed in the following section, the
magnitude and the speed of shifts in market liquidity are very unpre-
dictable. Replicating the safety of Treasury securities may be even more
difﬁcult. In the extreme, if government debt does disappear, investors will
no longer have the certainty of repayment in nominal or real terms
provided by holding, respectively, conventional or inﬂation-indexed Trea-
sury securities. Those default-free obligations allow investors the oppor-
tunity of reducing the total risk exposure of their portfolios according to
their appetite for bearing risk. In that sense the presence of risk-free Trea-
sury debt can be thought of as helping to complete markets. Presumably,
a welfare loss would be incurred if households no longer had recourse to
such obligations.
36 Of course, the force of this argument would be lessened
over time should progress in financial engineering result in instruments
that increasingly mimic the characteristics of Treasury securities.
For now, however, the availability of adequate substitutes seems lim-
ited, as evidenced by the considerable premium that some investors have
been willing to pay for Treasury securities. Among these investors, foreign
official institutions have been accumulating an increasing share of Trea-
sury securities (table 4), which has nearly doubled over the past ﬁve years.
Such institutions likely place great importance on liquidity and would
view a default on their holdings as having more significant repercussions
than is captured by the mean-variance framework above. As a result, these
institutions would likely be unwilling to substitute alternative assets for
Treasuries at the narrow yield spreads indicated by our empirical results.
The same may be true to some degree for a wider range of investors who
hold Treasury securities, making their demand more inelastic than sug-
gested above.
Total demand for Treasury securities may therefore be an aggregation
over global investors who have very elastic demand, which our mean-
variance optimization accurately represents, and other holders, possibly
including foreign official institutions, who are much less sensitive to cur-
rent market yields. These individual demands, illustrated in the left-hand
panel of figure 6, aggregate to the kinked demand schedule in the right-
hand panel. In such circumstances, calculations of the consequence of a
196 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
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because such a shift would move the market from the flat portion of its
demand schedule to the steep portion. That is, the shrinking supply of
Treasuries would increasingly be held by only those investors who value
them the most. Realizing this, investors would incorporate these expecta-
tions into asset prices today, causing yields to fall even though the mar-
ginal investor is still the global investor.
The critical question is why some classes of investors desire to hold
Treasury securities even when yields are relatively low. On the one hand,
if this interest-insensitive demand reﬂects a desire for the default-free sta-
tus that only Treasury securities provide, these investors presumably
would continue to bid to maintain those holdings—and would do so
increasingly aggressively—as the national debt shrinks. This would cause
returns on government debt to fall even lower. However, even these
investors may eventually be forced to shed their Treasuries as the supply
disappears. That could have considerable implications for international
capital flows and the exchange value of the dollar, depending on which
securities these investors choose as substitutes. The impact would be lim-
ited if these investors decided to maintain dollar-based holdings but to take
on some credit risk by holding private assets. However, if they instead
should decide to shift their holdings into foreign government bonds, for




By foreign official institutions
and others
Individual demand Total demand
Figure 6. Aggregation of Demands for Treasury Securities
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United States’ability to ﬁnance its large current account deﬁcit. The poten-
tial magnitudes of these flows are large, considering that foreign official
institutions’ holdings of Treasuries alone total $600 billion, well over
1
1⁄2 times the amount needed to ﬁnance last year’s current account deﬁcit.
On the other hand, if these interest-insensitive investors are holding
Treasury securities because they desire to be in the most liquid market,
they might be easier to dislodge—without putting strong downward pres-
sure on government yields or causing sharp movements in the exchange
rate—if another benchmark asset becomes established. That is, the nearly
vertical segment of the demand schedule in figure 6 could disappear if
these investors suddenly shifted to the new liquid instrument. But in order
to consider this possibility we must ﬁrst discuss the unique nature of Trea-
sury market liquidity.
The Self-Referencing Nature of Market Liquidity
The Treasury market is remarkably liquid, as evidenced by a large vol-
ume of trading at narrow spreads. Daily transactions in Treasury securi-
ties of primary dealers alone averaged about $200 billion over the first
three quarters of 2000.
37 Because of this extensive trading and the high
degree of competition and transparency among dealers, transactions costs
in the Treasury market are very low. Although these costs vary from one
security to another, dealers typically make markets at bid-offer spreads of
3.1 cents or less per $100 face value; by comparison, bid-offer spreads on
corporate bonds average about 13.3 cents per $100 for investment-grade
issues and 19.1 cents for high-yield issues.
38
The size of the Treasury market has likely contributed to its liquidity.
Even after the recent paydown of some Treasury debt, more than $3 trillion
in marketable Treasury securities remained in the hands of the public as
of June 2000. Also contributing to the liquidity of the Treasury market
are the various active derivatives contracts written on Treasury securities,
including futures on securities in various maturity ranges and options on
198 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
37. Federal Reserve Bank of New York (www.ny.frb.org/pihome/statistics/msytd.00).
38. Federal Reserve Bank of New York data; figures for corporate debt securities are
from Hong and Warga (2000).
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repurchase agreements (repos) on Treasury securities also exists, which
is crucial for allowing market participants to establish long and short posi-
tions without committing much capital.
Besides making them highly valuable to many types of investors, the
liquidity of Treasury securities allows them to serve several important
functions in global financial markets. Treasury securities are extensively
used in hedging interest rate exposure and in pricing other fixed-income
securities. In part because of these functions, Treasury securities are often
referred to as benchmarks in the fixed-income market. Market participants
often find it convenient to quote corporate bonds in terms of the spread
between their yields and that of a Treasury security of comparable matu-
rity. Any spread over the default-free Treasury base rate largely repre-
sents compensation for credit risk and not other factors that may influ-
ence yields. The liquidity of Treasury securities ensures that the quoted
yield available at a particular time is never stale, but rather reflects cur-
rent market conditions. 
Liquidity is perhaps even more important for the use of Treasury secu-
rities as hedging instruments. The deep market for Treasury securities
allows market participants to establish large positions and change them
quickly at low cost, as is needed for hedging purposes. Indeed, on aver-
age over the first three quarters of 2000, primary dealers reported having
an aggregate of $119 billion in long positions in Treasury securities and
$171 billion in short positions.
39 Many of these positions were established
to hedge the interest rate risk of positions in other fixed-income securi-
ties, whereas others may simply reﬂect portfolio decisions or market-mak-
ing activity. The use of Treasury securities for hedging and other trading-
related purposes in turn further contributes to the market’s liquidity.
Although the liquidity of the Treasury market remains impressive, it
appears to have deteriorated somewhat in recent years. Market participants
have become increasingly concerned about the outlook for the continued
paydown of Treasury debt, and they question whether the Treasury will
be able to maintain large, regular offerings of new issues much longer.
40
Large issue sizes make a security easier to find in the market when an
Vincent Reinhart and Brian Sack 199
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9760-06  BPEA Reinhart  12/21/2000 14:18  Page 199investor wants to trade. Regular issuance allows investors to anticipate
when they can roll their hedging positions into a new issue, and it facili-
tates the longer-term repo transactions used to establish those positions.
Partly because of these concerns, dealers are reportedly committing less
capital to market-making activity in Treasury securities and have been
requiring a larger spread for engaging in transactions. Bid-ask spreads on
ﬁve- and ten-year Treasury notes, which initially widened during the ﬁnan-
cial market turmoil in the fall of 1998, have remained elevated over 1999
and 2000, as the liquidity of the market has not fully recovered. More-
over, investors have been willing to pay unusually large premiums for the
most liquid Treasury securities, especially on-the-run issues, which are the
most recently issued securities in each maturity class. Those premiums
widened considerably during the fall of 1998, as investors became more
concerned about liquidity, and have remained quite wide since then, partly
reflecting the impact of cutbacks in the supply of on-the-run issues in the
presence of continued strong demand for liquid benchmark securities.
The deterioration in the liquidity of Treasury securities and the idio-
syncratic movements in their yields, driven by their potential scarcity, have
led market participants to search for alternative liquid securities that might
be able to replace Treasuries as benchmarks. The two most widely dis-
cussed alternatives are the debt securities issued by several government-
sponsored enterprises, and swaps to exchange fixed and floating interest
rate payments in dollars. 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are congressionally chartered pri-
vate entities, have initiated programs to issue large amounts of debt secu-
rities on a regular schedule. The securities issued under these programs
attempt to mimic the characteristics of Treasury securities that have con-
tributed to their liquidity. Trading volume and dealer positions in agency
securities have risen sharply since 1998, when data first became avail-
able, and these securities have reportedly become more actively traded in
overnight and term repo markets. Similarly, open interest in futures on ten-
year agency notes, which the Chicago Board of Trade only began offer-
ing in March, has picked up impressively, although it remains only a small
fraction of open interest in the ten-year Treasury note.
The market for interest rate swaps has also become considerably more
active in recent years. By engaging in a swap to exchange ﬁxed and ﬂoating
streams of interest payments, two parties can establish offsetting expo-
sures to interest rate risk with little commitment of capital. This makes
200 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
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that some market participants have begun to shift their hedging away from
Treasury securities and into swaps. Data on swaps market activity are not as
readily available as are data for agency securities, but the notional amount
of outstanding interest rate swaps reported by the Bank for International
Settlements increased a remarkable 129 percent from 1996 to 1999.
41
Despite some evidence of a shift in liquidity in the U.S. fixed-income
market, the extent to which these securities will become liquid alternatives
to Treasury securities is not yet clear. One reason is that changes in
investors’ participation in a market can have highly nonlinear effects on
market liquidity due to the externalities generated by trading. The over-
whelming majority of debt instruments are bought and sold on the over-the-
counter market, where trading conventions evolve based on prevailing prac-
tices. In this environment a small change in the willingness of investors to
participate can cause a fairly sharp contraction in market activity.
42Treasury
securities remain the market benchmark only because participants believe
that most other participants also think of them as the benchmark. In other
words, market participants commit to trade in Treasury securities because
they expect others to do so. Should they come to believe that others will not
participate, neither will they, and the result will be a self-fulfilling
prophecy. Thus the mere threat that Treasuries could lose their benchmark
status could have serious consequences for market activity. 
We can make this explicit by modeling trading as an activity needing
aggregate effort on both the buy and the sell side. For simplicity, suppose
there are two agents, j and k, and that the beneﬁt (B
j and B
k, respectively)
each accrues from an activity is increasing in the agent’s own participation
(p
j and p
k, respectively) and that of the other agent (p
k and p
j, respectively),
who has a symmetric beneﬁt calculus. If there is a constant marginal cost
c to participating, each potential entrant will equate marginal cost and ben-
efit for possible levels of the other’s participation. This individual choice
problem traces out a locus of participation as a function of that of the other
agent, which depends on the functional form of beneﬁts. For example, sup-
pose that the benefit that agent j accrues from participation can be
expressed as
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activity and a positive externality conveyed by the other’s effort. Cost is
assumed to be proportional to scale:
We assume that the externalities are limited, so that each agent benefits
directly from his or her own participation more than he or she benefits
indirectly from the participation of the other agent (    ). Also, marginal
beneﬁt is diminishing in aggregate participation,   +   1.
Under these assumptions, equating marginal benefit with the constant
marginal cost of participation implies that the optimal degree of effort by
agent j is
Participation is increasing in the participation of the other agent, steeply at
first because the marginal benefit of one’s own effort is high. Ultimately,
however, diminishing returns set in.
The other potential participant, agent k, confronts exactly the same
calculation, which produces a participation function mirroring that of
agent j. Because the two schedules are mirror images, the market clears
when the effort of both participants is equal (solid lines in ﬁgure 7). Alge-
braically, there are two ﬁxed points at which effort is equal, p1 = p2 = p*:
and trivially, p*= 0.
The point that this model makes is simple: there are two possible out-
comes, one with high participation by both parties and one with zero par-
ticipation.
43 Although the high-trade outcome makes both parties better
off, there is no guarantee that they will achieve that outcome if they are not
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trust between entities that provide similar services to the same client base,
and given the problems of antitrust enforcement. The situation resembles
a classic prisoners’dilemma.
Perhaps market participants will recognize their self-interest and vol-
untarily and independently choose the high-trade outcome, but again there
is no guarantee—that is the prisoner’s dilemma. Market convention, the
creation of an industry group that sets standards, and government leader-
ship are among the means available to allow parties to cooperate in ﬁnding
the high-trade outcome without trusting to luck or to private communica-
tion between rivals. Importantly, this might be an area where the size of the
market matters. In the last half of the twentieth century, the sheer magni-
tude of Treasury securities outstanding, and the expectation that they
would be around for a while to come, offered reassurance that the high-
trade outcome could be supported. As an infrastructure developed around









Figure 7. Theoretical Determination of Treasury Market Participation
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the retention of that outcome.
The prospect of a paydown of government debt, however, could per-
turb that equilibrium. This disturbance can be translated into the model
by raising the cost to trade. Such a change lowers the benefits associated
with participation by the other person and raises the cost of one’s own
participation. This pulls both offer curves toward the origin and, because
the two curves are highly nonlinear, may produce a large reduction in
participation for even small revisions to benefits or costs (dashed lines in
figure 7). Indeed, that reassessment might lead participants to doubt the
power of market convention to enforce the high-trade outcome. Thus,
depending on the market, volume could decline dramatically or even dry
up altogether.
The Treasury bill market perhaps provides a case study of what happens
when market participants come to doubt that the high-trade outcome will
be sustained. Historically, issuance of Treasury bills has served as a shock
absorber, balancing the government’s overall need for funds with a desire
to keep auction amounts of coupon securities as predictable as possible.
When tax coffers began to bulge unexpectedly in 1997 and 1998, the Trea-
sury trimmed bill issuance first and by more than its other offerings. In
the six quarters beginning in April 1997, the Treasury paid down nearly
$150 billion, or about 19 percent, of the amount of bills outstanding. Since
then both trading volume and dealer positions in bills have moved con-
siderably lower: average daily trading volume has fallen from $51
1⁄2 billion
in 1996 to $25
1⁄2 billion by 2000 (figure 8). What is particularly instruc-
tive in that example is the speed and extent to which market participants
changed their perception of the market benchmark. Discussions with mar-
ket participants indicate that the market has increasingly viewed Eurodol-
lar cash and futures as replacing Treasury bills as the benchmark securities
at shorter maturities. Lou Crandall points out that this transition began
many years earlier,
44 but the cutbacks in bill issuance over recent years
have likely accelerated the shift.
Going forward, the important issue is whether a similar shift will be
observed among coupon securities. As figure 8 shows, although trading
volume in Treasury coupon securities has remained fairly steady, market
activity in agency debt securities has picked up sharply. Moreover, the evi-
204 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
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orated somewhat over recent years. The model suggests that a shift in
activity, if it does take place, may be uneven and unpredictable.
The stakes involved in becoming the next benchmark are quite large.
From the perspective of an alternative issuer, efforts to reduce the costs of
trading in its own issues and to increase market confidence that a high-
trade outcome in that market segment will ensue may be rewarded with
significant savings on borrowing costs. Moreover, if an issuer is able to
achieve benchmark status, the liquidity of its securities will tend to rein-
force that status. Hence the potential shift in activity in ﬁxed-income mar-
kets over the next several years may have implications that will persist
for some time.
The potential shift also has implications for the U.S. government,
because the depth and breadth of the Treasury market have long given the
government access to cheaper funding than other issuers. Given the self-
reinforcing nature of market liquidity, that avenue to funding may be
costly to rebuild should it fall into disrepair. In framing their current debt
management strategy, the national authorities have to consider their con-
fidence in projections that budget surpluses will continue to the point
where debt disappears. They must also consider how soon thereafter
adverse demographic trends will cause budget deficits to recur, forcing the
government to return to the market. Under current projections, the disap-
pearance of the debt will come soon, and its reappearance seems remote.










Figure 8. Average Daily Trading Volume in Treasury and Agency Debt Markets,
1996–2000a
Sources: Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues.
a. Through August.
b. Includes coupon securities and discount notes.
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ble in economic performance, could quickly change that outlook.
45 Thus
the path of declining Treasury debt and the associated withdrawal of mar-
ket liquidity are subject to considerable uncertainty. In such an environ-
ment, continuing to issue debt (either by relaxing fiscal restraint or by
accumulating assets) has an option value, keeping the market viable on the
possibility that it will be needed again in the future.
46 Such considera-
tions, of course, have to be weighed against the macroeconomic benefits,
which include the crowding in of physical capital as debt disappears.
Conclusion
Considerable attention has been directed toward ofﬁcial projections that
U.S. federal budget surpluses will accumulate to the point that, with
unchanged fiscal policies, Treasury debt will be paid down early in the
next decade. Less attention has been paid to projections of central gov-
ernment budget balances in many industrial countries that are similar to
that in the United States. From the perspective of the global economy, if
current policies continue, current and expected future fiscal restraint
should lessen demands on the pool of available world saving. This can be
viewed as the mirror image of the huge federal deﬁcits of the early 1980s.
Economists at that time pointed out that prices of long-lived instruments
bring forward expectations of pressures on short-term interest rates asso-
ciated with projected budgetary excesses. By analogy to the 1980s prece-
dent, expectations of future fiscal restraint should now be holding long-
term interest rates down. Indeed, a panel data set of nineteen countries
indicates that fiscal policy has been an important factor in the recent flat-
tening of yield curves in many countries worldwide.
In the United States, budget surpluses have coincided with a widening
current account deficit. Basic accounting dictates that, as long as that
deﬁcit persists, foreign investors will be adding claims on U.S. entities to
their portfolios. However, as budget surpluses mount and Treasury debt is
paid down, foreigners either will have to be satisﬁed increasingly with pri-
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away from domestic holders. This could require considerable changes in
market prices if foreign investors have a strong preference for U.S. Trea-
sury obligations. Analysis using a portfolio balance model, however, ﬁnds
that the implications for the foreign exchange value of the dollar are not
obvious, because other market returns, including public-private interest
rate spreads, also can adjust. And given the high correlation among rates of
return across major classes of financial assets, a mean-variance optimiza-
tion approach projects quite modest changes in risk premiums.
Any discussion of paydowns of government debt also has to consider
the adjustments in the structure of financial markets attendant on the
disappearance of benchmark securities. If market liquidity is self-
referencing in nature—that is, if market participants frequent a particu-
lar trading venue because they expect others to do the same—the drying
up of liquidity in the Treasury market and the emergence of an alterna-
tive benchmark could follow a nonlinear path. 
Although we have considered these various factors separately, their
effect on interest rates is not necessarily additive. By itself, the dwindling
supply of Treasury securities should work to lower longer-term yields on
those securities when, as is probably the case today, it reflects a fiscal
policy path that investors anticipate will put downward pressure on real
interest rates over time. Because these developments also imply a
markedly declining share of Treasury securities in the portfolios of
investors who view other assets as imperfect substitutes, Treasury yields
may fall somewhat more quickly than the returns on other assets. At the
same time, however, liquidity in the Treasury market may suffer if partic-
ipants come to see less of a direct beneﬁt from being active in that market
and infer that other participants will make that same determination.
Although the premium on Treasury securities has apparently risen as their
supply has been reduced, in the longer run the liquidity advantage that
Treasury securities now enjoy may erode, and this will tend to raise inter-
est rates.
Even this calculation falls well short of a prediction about the current
level of interest rates, because our analysis has remained silent about the
forces that have produced the underlying change in policy. For instance,
if the effective tax rate has risen because of a pickup in the rate of growth
of productivity, the expectation of higher profits from investment might
be expected to push real interest rates higher. The point of this paper is
Vincent Reinhart and Brian Sack 207
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force working to offset some of the upward pressure.
Among the factors affecting current interest rates and investors’antici-
pations of future rates is the reaction of monetary policymakers to the
changed ﬁscal position.
47 Indeed, in an inﬂuential class of models, the level
of debt itself is seen as an influence shaping monetary policymakers’
incentives. Simply put, with a large stock of nominal government debt out-
standing, unexpected inflation acts like a capital levy.
48 But from the rep-
utational models of central bank action pioneered by Robert Barro and
David Gordon,
49 agents’ knowledge that the return to unexpected infla-
tion is high should lead them to expect a bit more inflation on average.
By that logic, lower nominal debt loads should help trim inflation expec-
tations. Although such considerations may be quite important in emerg-
ing market economies, where the separation between fiscal and monetary
authorities is sometimes indistinct, we have chosen, given our emphasis on
industrial countries, not to model such mechanisms.
Although the models presented in this paper do not indicate a clear
direction for macroeconomic policy as debt disappears, they do caution
that this fall in the debt will send multiple ripples through financial mar-
kets. The last model presented opens another window on policy setting:
in particular, authorities should recognize that ﬁnancial markets may well
be in the midst of a race among private sector and quasi–private sector
institutions to become the issuer of the next benchmark. The stakes are
high, and the race may become quite heated. If one entity does become the
new benchmark issuer, its securities will trade at a yield advantage, reﬂect-
ing both their superior liquidity and the presumption that public authorities
will be likely to step in to avoid systemic problems should the issuer falter.
Moreover, there is a good chance, given the self-referencing nature of li-
quidity, that a security that achieves benchmark status will become
entrenched. Hence the window for public policy action may be constrained
to the period of transition—which appears to be right now. At a mini-
mum, authorities may have to consider mechanisms that facilitate the
emergence of an alternative benchmark that does not rely on the credit
208 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
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whether the overall benefits of maintaining a liquid Treasury debt market
should factor into their policy decisions on taxation, spending, and the
accumulation of assets. Weighed against this, however, must be the bene-
ﬁts that accrue from a net saving and investment balance that favors more
rapid capital accumulation over time.
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Discussion
John Heaton: Vincent Reinhart and Brian Sack examine a very important
and timely question, namely, are the projected government surpluses both
in the United States and in other major industrial countries having a signiﬁ-
cant effect on ﬁnancial markets in the United States and around the world?
The authors attack this problem in three related ways. First, they ask whether
the bond market is reacting to the expected decline in the stock of govern-
ment debt by bidding up the prices of long-term government bonds relative
to short-term bonds. Second, they ask whether changes in the supply of gov-
ernment debt are likely to have important spillover effects on the returns to
other securities. Third, they examine whether a decline in liquidity in the
market for U.S. government securities is likely to cause important prob-
lems for ﬁnancial markets. From this analysis they conclude that the mag-
nitude of the effect of reducing U.S. government debt is difﬁcult to predict.
Reinhart and Sack argue that the projected surpluses appear to be hav-
ing a significant effect on the term structure of interest rates. Long-term
interest rates are likely to be low as these surpluses continue and are used
to retire government debt. This may produce a benefit if the lower rates
on long-term Treasury securities lead to lower long-term borrowing rates
for households and corporations. There is a potentially offsetting welfare
effect from a reduction in the liquidity of the market for Treasury securi-
ties, however. The government may therefore want to proceed carefully
in how it retires the national debt. 
After reviewing the latest facts about government surpluses and GDP
around the world, Reinhart and Sack present a qualitative discussion of
the economic effects of a predictable decline in the outstanding stock of
government debt. When government debt is viewed as net wealth, a fore-
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This should lead to a decline in consumption and therefore to a decline in
future interest rates. To quantify this effect with an economic model would
require a very detailed analysis, in which the exact role for government debt
in the determination of wealth is specified and quantitatively believable.
Standard mechanisms that could be considered would be finite lives or
various financial market imperfections, such as borrowing constraints.
Since the pattern of government spending in most countries also changes
along with the decline in outstanding debt, it would likely be quite difﬁcult to
calibrate the effect of all of these changes using a simple economic model.
To avoid these problems, the authors instead look empirically at the reac-
tion of financial markets to changes in the fiscal balance of various gov-
ernments. Using a panel data set of countries that are members of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, they exam-
ine whether the slope of the yield curve in a country is related to its 
budget surplus. The expectations hypothesis of the term structure predicts
that expectations about future interest rates determine the slope of 
the yield curve. When interest rates are expected to decline because of, 
say, predicted lower government debt in the future, long-term interest 
rates should be relatively low compared with short-term rates. Hence 
by examining the relationship between the slope of the yield curve 
and budget deﬁcits or surpluses, Reinhart and Sack are attempting to directly
test the idea that there is an important expectational crowding-out effect.
Expectations of future nominal interest rates are determined by expecta-
tions of future inﬂation and future real interest rates. These expectations are
likely inﬂuenced by projections of budget surpluses. However, forecasts of the
future course of monetary policy and of the business cycle are likely to be
important as well. To control for these effects, the authors include GDP
growth, forecasts of inﬂation, the unemployment rate, and the lagged short-
term interest rate in their regressions of the slope of the yield curve on the bud-
get surplus. Consistent with an important expectational crowding-out effect,
these regressions indicate that the slope of the yield curve is signiﬁcantly neg-
atively related to the ratio of the budget surplus to GDP. This result is certainly
interesting. It is at odds, however, with some previous work that finds no
relationship between the slope of the yield curve and budget deﬁcits.
1Also,
before we interpret their result as implying that a reduction in the outstand-
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costs for corporations and households, several issues need to be addressed.
Most empirical studies of the expectations hypothesis of the term struc-
ture include several lags of the state variables.
2 The lag structure seems to
be needed to capture slowly moving expectations and the dynamics of the
business cycle and inflation. The budget surplus–to-GDP ratio that the
authors use could easily be capturing the missing variables that are often
found to predict future interest rates. Further, the economic effect identiﬁed
in this paper could easily run from the surplus-to-GDP ratio to expectations
of future monetary policy that lead to a forecast of interest rates.
Analyses of the expectations hypothesis also typically conclude that the
model is very much at odds with the data. For example, the forward pre-
mium does a poor job of predicting changes in interest rates. This is a poten-
tially signiﬁcant issue for the authors’regression of future interest rates on
variables that include the surplus-to-GDP ratio. They would like this regres-
sion to identify the effect of the right-hand-side variables on expected interest
rates. Given the fact that the forward premium does not clearly serve this role,
I ﬁnd it very difﬁcult to interpret the variables in the authors’regressions.
The basic problem with the expectations hypothesis as a description of the
term structure of interest rates is that risk premiums likely exhibit signifi-
cant variation over time. This variation appears to be a function of the busi-
ness cycle, inﬂation, and other variables. It is quite possible that the surplus-
to-GDP variable is correlated with variables that predict risk premiums. 
A final difficulty involves the application of the authors’ regression
methodology to a panel regression. It appears that the panel has been treated
as if there were no cross-sectional dependence in the error term. Since these
regressions use data taken from open economies with integrated capital mar-
kets, this assumption is unlikely to be satisﬁed. The authors’ﬁgure 3 sug-
gests that a substantial part of the identified effect is coming from a few
episodes in the United States. The cross-country analysis is supposed to bol-
ster this evidence, but the yield curves of the various countries are correlated
with the U.S. yield curve. As a result, there is quite likely to be less infor-
mation about the coefﬁcient on the surplus-to-GDP ratio than the reported
t-statistics capture. 
For all of these reasons, I ﬁnd the results of the authors’panel study dif-
ficult to interpret. The ratio of the budget surplus to GDP could easily be
picking up expectations of future inflation, GDP, and risk premiums, all
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expectational crowding-out effect. Much additional work remains to be
done before we can conclude that the current and projected surpluses have
a large effect on the yield curve and therefore on interest rates in general.
The authors’analysis of the term structure represents an attempt to use
the yield curve to gauge the extent of non-Ricardian equivalence using
ﬁnancial market data and observed variation in the budget deﬁcit. An alter-
native approach is to take a stand on an economic model and subject it to
the predicted variation in the outstanding quantity of government securi-
ties. This is what the authors do in the next part of their paper.
Suppose that investors’ utility functions are quadratic and that these
investors derive all of their consumption from their investments in assets (or
that consumption is proportional to wealth). These investors rank portfolios
on the basis of their expected returns and the variance of those returns.
The optimal portfolio chosen by each investor depends on his or her risk tol-
erance, and on the expected returns and covariances of returns between the
various assets in the market. Market equilibrium requires that supply equal
demand. Given the supplies of the assets, the covariances between their
returns, and the degree to which the typical investor is risk averse, the equi-
librium of the model predicts the expected returns on these assets.
The authors calculate the supply of a large number of assets, including
government debt, corporate equity, corporate debt, and agency debt,
worldwide. They also estimate the covariance structure for the returns to
these assets. They then examine what happens to expected returns if the
supply of U.S. government debt is set to zero in the model. 
Their general conclusion is that the returns to other securities are not
greatly affected by setting the supply of government debt to zero, because
the return to U.S. government debt is highly correlated with the returns to
many other securities, including corporate debt and U.S. agency debt.
Investors therefore have a simple time substituting away from U.S. gov-
ernment debt and into other securities. Because these other securities are
in ample supply, the effect on expected returns is not substantial. 
This conclusion seems very reasonable. The largest risk in the market
for ﬁxed-income securities of all types is interest rate risk. Variation in this
single factor dominates most of the other risks for agency debt and for
high-quality corporate debt. These other securities can therefore easily
substitute for government debt as a relatively risk-free investment.
In interpreting this type of analysis, however, one must keep several
important issues in mind. First, in their baseline calculations the authors
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investors’portfolios. Essentially, they are making an extreme assumption
about non-Ricardian equivalence, where investors completely discount
all future tax liabilities. Since this polar extreme should put an upper
bound on the predicted changes in returns, modifying this assumption
should, if anything, reinforce their conclusion. 
Second, this type of model has a very difﬁcult time explaining observed
average returns once the implications for consumption are added to the
model. In particular, an important part of aggregate consumption is unrelated
to the returns to risky securities generally. As a result, the historical-average
returns to many risky securities seem much too high unless investors are
very risk averse. In some of their analysis the authors assume a very high
level of risk aversion, however, and so their results are likely robust to a
modiﬁcation to the model that adds additional sources of consumption risk. 
A final objection to the authors’ analysis of portfolio choice is that
investors have other reasons to hold U.S. Treasury securities, independent
of their expected return and their one-period covariance with other secu-
rities. For example, institutions that seek to hedge such long-term obliga-
tions as mortgages and mortgage-backed securities generate demand for
Treasuries. Further, the market for U.S. Treasury securities is much more
liquid than the markets for corporate or agency debt, and this makes Trea-
sury securities very useful for purposes of hedging and as collateral. These
considerations have contributed to making these securities a standard
benchmark against which other securities are priced.
The authors recognize this, and in the last part of their paper they
discuss the special role played by Treasury securities and the fact that 
their declining supply seems associated with increasing spreads between
Treasury yields and other long-term securities, such as swaps. This could
indicate that, in the short run at least, market participants cannot easily
substitute other relatively risk-free, long-term securities for Treasuries
because of the particular role that Treasuries play. The spreads in these
markets could also reflect uncertainty about what set of securities will
ultimately replace Treasury securities as a source of liquidity. However,
the interpretation of changes in spreads is difficult because we know that
these spreads vary over time in response to systematic variation in credit
risk and liquidity.
3 Given that caveat, it is interesting to consider how the
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securities. 
The authors also discuss a model in which rising liquidity in a market is
self-reinforcing. Once a set of securities becomes liquid, it begins to serve
a special purpose in trading, which in turn generates more liquidity.
Investors may also develop specialized technology and new trading meth-
ods that are suitable for this particular class of securities but not easily
transferable to others. If the supply of the liquid security is then reduced
exogenously, this could cause substantial difficulties for traders and
investors in the short run. Essentially, a new liquid market needs to be
established. As Reinhart and Sack point out, this means that considerable
uncertainty could prevail in this market in the short run until a new liquid
market is established. They argue that government may properly play a
role in creating this market so that the liquid benchmark security is not
subject to credit risk.
The government may also have a potentially important role in providing
the regulatory environment that allows the market to react ﬂexibly to changes
in liquidity. The ﬁnancial market will probably settle on a new set of securi-
ties that can ultimately play the special role currently played by Treasury
securities. As the government withdraws from the market, agencies and cor-
porations will have an incentive to increase their supply of debt. In the past,
as the supply of government debt changed, so did the supply of corporate
debt, reﬂecting the general demand for debt instruments generated by fric-
tions such as the tax code.
4Although the market’s reaction to changes in the
liquidity of Treasury securities probably conveys an important regulatory
message, it is unlikely that there is an important lesson here for ﬁscal policy.
To conclude, my reading of the evidence presented in this paper is that
the direct effect of the declining supply of U.S. government debt on returns
on other securities is likely to be small. In the short run, changes in
liquidity may cause some problems, but this does not have important
implications for the conduct of fiscal policy or for what should be done
with the budget surplus. An important issue not addressed in this paper is
one of political economy. The most important effect of government debt
may be as a device for disciplining future governments. If the debt is
retired, this may create an incentive for future governments to spend and
increase the debt once again.
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variance analysis used in the paper may overstate the substitutability
between Treasuries and corporate bonds, and hence underestimate the
price changes that would accompany a substantial decline in the supply
of Treasuries. Differences in liquidity, default risk, legal or regulatory eli-
gibility for some portfolios, tax features, and call features all affect sub-
stitutability in ways not captured well in that kind of analysis, which
focuses purely on the volatility of market returns due to interest rate ﬂuc-
tuations. Friedman reported that starting with independent estimates of
expected returns and estimating portfolio behavior directly from observed
movements in investors’portfolio holdings usually implies lower estimates
of asset substitutability in these circumstances. Friedman also recalled that
the restriction against the Treasury issuing long-term debt was removed
in the mid-1970s. He suggested testing whether the effect of deﬁcits on the
term structure was changed by removing this restriction.
Daniel Sichel reasoned that the underlying factors leading to the
increase in the budget balance may themselves have an effect on the term
structure. For example, to the extent that faster productivity growth has
been a source of the rise in the surplus-to-GDP ratio, this increase should
also be associated with an outward shift in investment demand by business
and a higher equilibrium interest rate. He suggested that recognizing this
and possibly other sources of the change in the budget balance might
improve explanations of the term structure. As to whether the estimated
term structure effects come from inflation expectations or from the real
term structure, Stephen Zeldes noted that the present downward slope can-
not answer that question. One has to look historically at how the real term
structure has changed with changes in the surplus. Zeldes also noted a
disconnect between present concerns that the government debt may get too
small and present projections of huge unfunded liabilities in the Social
Security trust fund. In the argument over privatizing Social Security, some
have suggested issuing “recognition bonds” to compensate those who have
paid into the system but who, under privatization, would not receive the
benefits they now expect. Zeldes wondered how the market would accept
making this implicit liability explicit through the issuance of such bonds.
James Duesenberry reasoned that any projection of future interest rates
needed to recognize the saving and investment balances that would accom-
pany the projected surpluses. At present, private investment exceeds pri-
vate saving by a large margin, with the gap filled by surpluses in the
216 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
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Model projections at the Federal Reserve show interest rates declining as
the federal surplus grows, with interest rates stimulating investment and
reducing the current account deﬁcit, but with the ratio of private saving to
GDP, which is relatively insensitive to interest rates, changing little. How-
ever, he questioned the validity of such projections, which keep the per-
sonal saving rate near zero, since history records few periods when saving
rates were that low.
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